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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***AC
Date: 1/22/2019 6:40 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

DRUMMOND FINANCIAL SERVICES,
LLC; et al.,
Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
2014CV253677

V.

TMX FINANCE HOLDINGS, INC.; et al.,
Business Case Div. 4
Defendants.

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES
The above styled action is before the Court on various motions and discovery disputes.
Having considered the record, the Court finds and orders as follows: 1
I.

DISCOVERY RELATED DISPUTES
The Court previously entered a comprehensive Order on Pending Motions and Requests

("Discovery Order") wherein the Court, inter alia, ruled on various motions and discovery
disputes and instructed the parties, through counsel, to meet and confer on other discovery
requests. 2 Insofar as the parties have conferred on various occasions and have advised that
certain discovery disputes remain and additional disputes have arisen, the Court addresses those
disputes below.

For ease of reference the Drummond Financial Services, LLC related entities are referred to collectively
herein as "Plaintiffs" and the TMX Financial Holdings, Inc. related entities are referred to collectively herein as
"Defendants".
2
. See Order on various Pending Motions and Requests (Mar. 13, 2018).

A. Applicable standards

With respect to the general scope of discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(b)(l) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of

the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence ...

(Emphasis added).
"[I]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very
broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that is or may become an issue in
litigation." Bowden v. The Med. Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291, 773 S.E.2d 692, 696 (2015)
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal quotations
omitted). The powers of the trial court to control the time, place, scope and financing of
discovery are construed broadly. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587,
589, 452 _S.E.2d 159, 162 (1994), disapproved of on other grounds by Chrysler Grp. LLC v.
Walden, No. S17G0832, 2018 WL 1323992 (Ga. Mar. 15, 2018); Bicknell v. CBT Factors Corp.,
171 Ga. App. 897, 899, 321 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1984). Further, "an evasive or incomplete answer
is to be treated as a failure to answer." O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-37(a)(3). See Stephens v. Howle, 132
Ga. App. 92, 93 207 S.E.2d 632, 633-34 (1974) (holding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that plaintiffs responses to interrogatories were invasive or incomplete
where the plaintiff failed to respond fully in "some of the answers").
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B. Documents Related to Buyouts

Insofar as Defendants' counsel has advised that "all of the emails Plaintiffs seek are
communications between TMX employees and the TMX Legal Department sent at the direction
and request of TMX counsel after this litigation began, to aid counsel in addressing the specific
claims at issue in this case," and that the emails at issue are "documents generated exclusively
for the limited purpose of defending against Plaintiffs' claims in this litigation," Plaintiffs have
withdrawn their request that the Court order Defendants to produce these documents. As such, no
further action from the Court is warranted.
C. Personnel Files

The Court previously directed counsel to confer regarding Plaintiffs' discovery requests
seeking the production of documents from the personnel files of certain individuals who are
current or former employees of Defendants. Although counsel have conferred, Plaintiffs' counsel
reports that issues remain regarding the production of documents from TMX employee personnel
files. Plaintiffs seek certain documents from the personnel files of individuals specifically named
in Plaintiffs' Third RPO No. 5, to wit: Keith Haberstroh; Leobardo Sanchez; Felix DeLeon;
James Batterson; Patrick Sudduth; Richard Todd Hale; Radamez Casillas; and Michael Ryan.
The foregoing individuals are current or former employees of Defendants that, in separate
Texas litigation involving similar allegations against Defendants, were shown to be involved in
or aware of unlawful OMV searching. Further, Plaintiffs specifically seek documents from their
personnel files regarding any OMV searching that occurred outside of Texas. Given these
individuals have knowledge of the conduct at issue in this action, the Court finds the discovery
sought is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request to compel is GRANTED and Defendants are ordered to produce
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any documents from the personnel files of the above individuals regarding OMV searching that
took place outside of Texas.
Plaintiffs also seek to compel further production regarding their requests for documents
regarding specific instances of conduct that violated the Interlocutory Injunction previously
issued in this matter. Defendants agreed to produce documents from the personnel files of certain
"Named Individuals" whose conduct violated the Interlocutory Injunction as well as their
"Supervisors." However, Plaintiffs also ask the Court to compel the production of personnel file
records of an additional 51 "Subordinates" who worked for the "Named Individuals" who may
have had an opportunity to observe, be trained in or cooperate in such conduct. Insofar as
Defendants have already produced personal file records of the specific individuals who allegedly
violated the Court's Interlocutory Injunction, the Court finds the request seeking additional
personnel file records of dozens of subordinates overbroad and declines to compel production of
same.

D. Additional Discovery Disputes Raised by Defendants
Defendants assert they have conferred with Plaintiffs regarding the foregoing additional
discovery disputes related to their (1) Third Requests for Production of Documents ("Third
RPDs"), (2) Amended Third Set of Interrogatories ("Amended Third Interrogatories"), and (3)
Requests for Production of Documents from Andr, Inc., Atlanta Title Loans, Inc., Aycox &
Aycox, Clayton, Inc., Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc., Aycox Enterprises, LTD, Aycox, Inc.,
Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc., Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc., LoanMax Title
Loans, LLC, and Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc., the newly added Plaintiffs3 ("New RPDs"), but
have been unable to reach an agreement.

See Order on Pending Motions and Requests (Mar. 13, 2018), pp. 20-22.
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a. Identification of Plaintiffs' "Operations Specialists" and "Traveling Store
Managers"(Amended Third Interrogatories Nos. 2, 14)
In its Feb. 12, 2017 Order on Discovery Disputes, the Court ordered that "[t]o the extent
there are 'Operations Specialists' employed by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs should produce [ certain]
requested information" including correspondence, phone records, and personnel files upon
finding such information relevant and likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

4

In their Amended Third Interrogatories, Defendants request that Plaintiffs identify each
employee "who currently has or previously had" the title of "operations specialist" or "traveling
store manager." (Amended Third Interrogatory No. 2) In response, Plaintiffs assert: they ran a
keyword search for the term "Operations Specialist", produced any responsive documents within
the agreed upon timeframe for the parties' ESI production and, thus, "have produced documents,
if any, from which the information requested in Interrogatory No. 2 may be derived"; and "after
a reasonable investigation, [they] were unable to identify any employee who currently holds the
title of 'operations specialist" After Defendants sought to compel a complete response to this
interrogatory, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental discovery response stating that their "human
resources system reflects that Whitney Hughes, Kristen Tambunga, Roxanna Martin, John
Denton, Samantha Jeffers, and Edwin Evans have had the title of operations specialist at some
point in time. "

6

Although Plaintiffs assert they have now "fully answered" this interrogatory "based on
the best information available to them and there simply is no more information to provide'",
Defendants have submitted an email exchange dated Sept. 3-4, 2010 between Jesse Anderson

4

See Order on Discovery Disputes (Feb. 17, 2017), p. 4.

Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants Amended Third Set of Interrogatories, No. 2
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Amended Third Set of Interrogatories (Aug. 23,
2018), No. 2.
7
Plaintiffs', Sept. 7, 2018, pp. 2-3.
6

5

(Vice President of Operations of Select Management Resources, LLC) and Annette Frederick,
Director of Human Resources of Select Management Resources, LLC) stating, inter alia:

Zach Farmer our current Manager in TX367 has been promoted to
Operations Specialist (Texas Traveler). His new position was effective as
of 08-30-2010, his new rate of pay is $40,000.00 salaried. As he has been
traveling with me all week he will not have hours logged in the system nor
will he going forward. 8
Defendants also have submitted documents indicating that Mr. Anderson in his Linkedln profile
claims to have held the position of Operations Specialist at Select Resource Management, LLC
from 2002 to 2004. Further, Defendants have submitted an email dated Jul. 3, 2015 from an
individual named Shannen Slaughter who includes in her signature line the title "Operations
Specialist.?" Although, as Plaintiffs point out, they may not be able to identify every person who
held themselves out as an operations specialist, Plaintiffs can search their human resources
systems and records to identify those individuals that Plaintiffs' executives and human resources
personnel recognized as Operations Specialists.
Accordingly, within fifteen (15) days of this order Plaintiffs must search their human
resources systems and records and supplement their discovery response with any other
individuals who currently or previously held the title of "operations specialist" or "traveling store
manager" or must affirmatively advise that no such additional responsive information is
available to them, and Plaintiffs will be held to their response. To the extent Plaintiffs rely on
documents produced in discovery to respond to this interrogatory, they cannot generally
reference their production but must specifically identify by Bates numbering or otherwise which
documents produced are responsive to this interrogatory. See Hull v. WTI, Inc., 322 Ga. App.
304, 307-08, 744 S.E.2d 825,829 (2013) (where the trial court held that "the production of over

8
9

Defendants' Letter, Oct. 12, 2018, Ex. A (emphasis added).
Id. at Ex. C.
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156,000 pages of documents with insufficient organization, coupled with the failure ... to identify
which documents are responsive to which ... requests .. .is inconsistent with [the defendant's]
obligations under the Civil Practice Act").
In their Amended Third Interrogatories, Defendants also request that Plaintiffs:
Describe the creation of the 'Operations Specialist' position, including but
not limited to who directed that the position be created who devised the
job functions associated with the position, who supervised the position,
and job descriptions created or modified, and any public postings for the
position. 10

Plaintiffs initially responded that they "are not aware of who created the term operation
specialist or the circumstances surrounding its creation."! 1 Again, after Defendants sought to
compel a complete response to this interrogatory, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental response
stating that "Plaintiffs do not have a job description for operations specialists and Plaintiffs are
not aware of any public postings for an operation specialist position.v'f
To the extent Plaintiffs have supplemented their response to affirmatively state they are
not aware of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the operations specialist position, do
not have a job description and are not aware of any pubic postings for the position, there is
nothing further for the Court to compel as to those specific aspects of the interrogatory.
However, insofar as Plaintiffs have now identified several individuals who held the title (and
may identify additional such individuals), within fifteen (15) days of this order Plaintiffs shall
supplement their discovery response to identify the supervisor(s) of each person identified in
response to Amended Third Interrogatory No. 2.

10

Defendants' Amended Third Interrogatories, No. 14.
Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants Amended Third Set oflnterrogatories, No. 14.
12
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Amended Third Set of Interrogatories (Aug. 7,
2018), No. 14.
II
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b. Identification of Plaintiffs' owners, shareholders, and members (Amended
Third Interrogatory No. 11; New RPD Nos. 1, 3-5; RPD Nos. 25-27)
Defendants' discovery requests asked Plaintiffs: to identify their parent companies,
owners, shareholders, members, and their respective ownership shares (Amended Third
Interrogatory No. 11; New RPD No. 3); to identify their subsidiaries (New RPD No. 4); to
produce documents sufficient to show Plaintiffs' corporate structure and relationship, including
any corporate affiliations among Plaintiffs (RPD No. 25; New RPD No. 5); and to produce
copies of Plaintiffs' articles of incorporation and bylaws (RPD Nos. 26-27; New RPO No. 1).
In response, Plaintiffs/Responding Parties raise a number of objections including that the
foregoing requests seek irrelevant information, seek sensitive, competitive and/or proprietary
business information, and are harassing. They also refer Defendants to other discovery responses
in which Plaintiffs, inter alia, identify which of the Plaintiffs incorporated after Mar. 1, 1992
operated a Georgia store and all of Plaintiffs' affiliates that have owned or operated stores in
Georgia since Dec. 29, 2010. Plaintiffs subsequently provided their articles of incorporation and
advised through counsel that "Plaintiffs do not have any organizational charts showing
'affiliations' among Plaintiffs."

13

In supplemental responses, Plaintiffs/Responding Parties state:

(1) No Plaintiff has a parent company; (2) No Plaintiff has any
subsidiaries; (3) No Plaintiff has ever owned or controlled any other
Plaintiff, either in whole or in part; (4) Plaintiffs are owned by one or
more individuals and the "affiliation" between or among Plaintiffs is by
common ownership and control at the individual shareholder or member
level. 14

13

Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), Ex. K; Plaintiffs' Letter (Sept. 7, 2018), Exs. J and K.
Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' Third Set of Requests for Production of
Documents, No. 25; Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants Requests for Production of
Documents from Andr, Inc., Atlanta Title Loans, Inc., Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc., Aycox & Martin Enterprises,
Inc., Aycox Enterprises, LTD, Aycox, Inc., Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc., Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles,
Inc., LoanMax Title Loans, LLC, and Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc., Nos. 3-5.
14

8

What appears to remain in dispute is whether Plaintiffs should have to identify their
owners, shareholders, and members and whether they should have to produce internal documents
that show Plaintiffs' corporate structure to the extent such exists. In their Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs assert they "are companies affiliated by common ownership and control
that are engaged in the business of making loans to consumers secured by motor vehicles."

15

In

their Second Counterclaim, Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs allege Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants "are engaged in an orchestrated and widespread scheme" involving trespass on
Counterclaim Plaintiffs' property, theft of trade secrets, and conversion of confidential financial
data, which allegedly occurred "with the sanction and approval of management.l''" Additionally,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs allege that, although employees allegedly participating in
illegal conduct "may have technically been employed by one corporate entity, the information
they gathered was shared across the Counterclaim Defendants' corporate structure" such that
they "are all equally liable for their own acts and for the acts of each other as a conspiracy.t''"
Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs also suggest that Plaintiffs/Counterclaim-Defendants are
using their corporate affiliations to transfer pawnshops among themselves in an attempt to evade
liability under the Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-130 et seq. 18
Given the foregoing allegations, the Court finds the requested information relevant and
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. To the extent responsive
documents contain confidential/proprietary information, a confidentiality order is in place in this
action to govern the disclosure and proper use of such information. Thus, within fifteen (15)

15

Second Amended Complaint, ,57.
Second Counterclaim by Defendants, ,,14, 45-52.
17
Id. at il5 I. Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs also suggest that Plaintiffs/Counterclaim/Defendants are
using their corporate affiliations to transfer pawnshops among themselves in an attempt to evade liability under the
Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-130 et seq. See Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), p. 5.
18
Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), pp. 6-7; Defendants' Letter (Oct. 12, 2018), pp. 4-5.
16
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days of this order Plaintiffs shall supplement their discovery responses to identify their owners,

shareholders, and members and to produce internal documents that show Plaintiffs' internal
corporate structure or to affirmatively state that no such responsive documents are in their
possession, custody, or control.
c. Disclosure of Georgia pawnshop stores owned/operated by Plaintiffs
(Amended Third Interrogatories Nos. 10-11; RPD Nos. 8, 12, 35; New RPD
Nos. 6-8)
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs: provide a corporate ownership history for all stores
operated by Plaintiffs or their affiliates in Georgia (Amended Third Interrogatory No. 1 O);
identify all shareholders, members, directors and officers for each Plaintiff who at any time
owned or operated a Georgia store for the period of Dec. 29, 2010 to the present (Amended
Third Interrogatory No. 11, addressed supra); produce documents reflecting the transfer of
ownership of any of Plaintiffs' stores located in Georgia since Dec. 29, 2014 (RPO No. 8);
produce documents relating to the sale or transfer of interest of any stores owed/operated by
Plaintiffs in Georgia since the filing of this action (RPO No. 12); and documents sufficient to
identify the location and dates of operation of Plaintiffs' stores (RPD No. 35). Similarly,
Defendants requested that newly added Plaintiffs produce documents identifying their
pawnbroker stores, trade names, and licenses to operation (New RPD Nos. 6-8).
In response, Plaintiffs refer to a list of stores in Georgia that Plaintiffs or their affiliates
owned or operated for the period of Dec. 29, 2010 through Jun. 1, 2017. They also provided
certain information for nine stores owned by certain Plaintiffs formed after Mar. 1, 1992, taking
the position that only such information is relevant to this litigation. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §44-12138(a)(l) ("A pawnbroker shall not use the term 'loan' in any advertisements or in connection
with any advertising of the business of the pawnbroker; provided, however, that the provisions of
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this sentence shall not apply to a pawnbroker in business on March 1, 1992, which uses the term
'loan' in connection with the name of the business or with advertising of the business").
The parties generally dispute the scope of the Georgia Pawnshop Act, its applicability to
the parties/their stores, and whether entities can escape liability under the Act through the
transfer of ownership of the stores. 19 Nevertheless, insofar as the ownership history of Plaintiffs'
stores, the sale/transfer of ownership interests, store locations, dates of operation, trade names,
and business licenses are relevant to this dispute, the Court finds these discovery requests seek
relevant information and are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As such,

within fifteen (15) days of this order Plaintiffs shall supplement and provide full responses to
the above discovery requests to the extent they have not already done so and to the extent such is
in their possession, custody or control.f"

d. Marketing of title pawns as "loans" (RPD Nos. 7, 9, 10, 23, 24; New RPD
Nos. 9-10/1
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs: provide copies of Georgia advertisements using the
word "loan" from Dec. 29, 2010 to the present and revenues attributable thereto (RPD Nos. 7, 9);
documents reflecting Plaintiffs' decision to use the word "loan" in Georgia instead of "pawn");
(RPO No. 1 O); copies of signage permit applications (RPO No. 23); and complaints generated as
a result of Plaintiffs' advertising activities (RPO No. 24). Similarly, Defendants served discovery
on the newly added Plaintiffs asking them to produce any advertisements using the word "loan"
and to produce documents reflecting their attempts to comply with the Georgia Pawnshop Act
(New RPO Nos. 9-10).

19

Compare Defendants' Letter (Aug. 3, 2018), pp. 6-7; Plaintiffs' Letter (Sept. 7, 2018), pp.5-6; Defendants'
Letter (Oct. 12, 2018), pp. 4-5.
20
With respect to RPD No. 35, Plaintiffs do not have to produce every document referencing their store
locations and dates of operations but rather must produce documents sufficient to identify each store location and
dates of operation.
21
New RPD Nos. 6-8 are addressed in Part I(D)(c), supra.

11

Given the allegations in Defendants First Counterclaim (as set forth in their Answer and
Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' Amended Counterclaim),
the Court finds the foregoing requests are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence relevant to the parties' claims and defenses. To the extent responsive
documents contain confidential/proprietary information, a confidentiality order is in place in this
action to govern the disclosure and proper use of such information. Plaintiffs are ordered to
supplement and provide full responses to the above discovery requests within fifteen (15) days

of this order.
e. Benefits derived from alleged theft of trade secrets (Amended Third
Interrogatories Nos. 7-9; RPD Nos. 19-21, 28-29, 36)
Defendants served a number of requests related to their claim that Plaintiffs stole
Defendants' financial and market data by sending "Secret Shoppers" to Defendants' stores to
photograph their "Goal Boards":
Amended Third Interrogatory No. 7: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within
a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper
photographed Goal Boards, describe (a) all staffing changes that occurred
within one year of the photographs being taken, and identify the names of
the employees making the changes and effected by the changes; and (b) all
changes in marketing expenditures that occurred within one year of the
photographs being taken, and identify the changes made, the persons
implementing the changes, and the decision maker behind the changes.
(Emphasis added)
Amended Third Interrogatory No. 8: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within
a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper
photographed Goal Boards, identify any lease renewals or lease
terminations at those stores that occurred within eighteen months of the
photographs being taken, and identify those individuals involved with the
renewals/terminations and the decision maker on the renewal or
termination. (Emphasis added)
Amended Third Interrogatory No. 9: Identify any of Plaintiffs' stores
that have opened between January 1, 2011 and the present that is
located within a 10-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores, including
12

any proposals outlining the reason(s) the location was determined to be a
viable location. (Emphasis added)

RPD No. 19: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within a 30-mile radius of any
of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards,
produce copies of lease renewals or lease terminations at those stores that
occurred within eighteen months of the photographs being taken.
(Emphasis added)
RPD No. 20: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within a 30-mile radius of any
of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards,
produce documents sufficient to show any staffing changes at those stores
that occurred within eighteen months of the photographs being taken.
(Emphasis added)
RPD No. 21: For any of Plaintiffs' stores within a 30-mile radius of any
of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards,
produce documents sufficient to show any changes in marketing
(including but not limited to changes in marketing budget, marketing
methods, and marketing strategy) at those stores that occurred within
eighteen months of the photographs being taken. (Emphasis added)
RPD No. 28: Documents sufficient to show any employee performance
plans or incentive plans for Plaintiffs' employees who worked at stores
within a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret
Shopper photographed Goal Boards. (Emphasis added)
RPD No. 29: Documents sufficient to show the rates of hourly pay,
salaries, bonuses, and changes in rates of pay or salaries for Plaintiffs'
employees who · worked at stores within a 30 mile radius of any of
Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards for
a period of six (6) months before and six (6) months after a Secret
Shopper photographed Goal Boards. (Emphasis added)
RPD No. 36: Documents sufficient to show the change in volume of loans
or pawns (both in number and dollar value) at any of Plaintiffs' stores
within a 30-mile radius of any of Defendants' stores where a Secret
Shopper photographed Goal Boards for a period of six (6) months before
and six (6) months after each date when a Secret Shopper photographed
Goal Boards.
(Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs object to these discovery requests on various grounds asserting, inter alia, that
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the requests are overly broad, unduly burdensome, without sufficient temporal or geographic
limitation, seek irrelevant information, and seek confidential/proprietary information. The Court
finds the requested information is relevant to Defendants' trade secret claim. To the extent
responsive documents contain confidential/proprietary information, a confidentiality order is in
place in this action to govern the disclosure and proper use of such information.
Nevertheless, the Court finds the requests are generally overly broad and without
sufficient temporal or geographic limitation. Thus, the Court:

narrows

the

requests

geographically to information related to Plaintiffs' stores located within a two (2) mile radius of
any of Defendants' stores where a Secret Shopper photographed Goal Boards (Amended Third
Interrogatories Nos. 7-9; RPO Nos. 19-21, 28-29, 36), similar to the geographic restrictions
initially placed on similar discovery requests made in the parties' related Texas litigation. The
Court also narrows the requests temporally with respect to staff changes (Amended Third
Interrogatory No. 7; RPO No. 20), marketing changes (Amended Third Interrogatory No. 7; RPO
No. 21 ), and lease renewals or terminations {Amended Third Interrogatory No. 8; RPO No. 19)
to that occurring within twelve months (12) months of the photographs being taken. Plaintiffs
shall supplement their responses accordingly within fifteen (15) days of this order.

f. Employee contracts relevant to tortious interference claim (RPD No. 4)
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Defendants unlawfully solicited
the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' employees by offering cash to divert current and prospective
customers from the Direct Lender Plaintiffs to Defendants and, in so doing, sought to have the
employees breach their employment contracts with and their duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs.22
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs produce copies of any employee contracts that it contends
were breached because of Defendants' alleged conduct (RPO No. 4).
22

Second Amended Complaint, ilil 135-136.
14

In response, Plaintiffs produced three "standard form employee" contracts but did not
produce any specific employee contracts. Plaintiffs also identified individuals they are currently
aware of who may have received a referral fee from Defendants. However, Plaintiffs assert that
although they have repeatedly requested that Defendants identify Plaintiffs' employees to whom
Defendants paid referral fees, Defendants have not provided a substantive response thereby
impeding progress with respect to Defendants' discovery request.
The Court finds the information requested by Defendants regarding the employee
contracts at issue with respect to Plaintiffs' tortious interference claim is relevant and reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Similarly, and as set forth in Part l(E),

infra, the Court finds Plaintiffs' discovery request seeking information regarding Plaintiffs'
employees who were paid referral fees by Defendants is relevant and reasonably calculated to
lead to discovery of admissible evidence. Thus, upon the parties' compliance with the Court's
ruling in Part I(E), Plaintiffs shall supplement their discovery responses with the specific
employee contracts at issue with respect to their tortious interference claim or, alternatively, shall
affirmatively state that the standard form contracts already produced are identical to every
employee contract allegedly breached and provide the employee's name, title, store number,
store location, the date of the agreement, and the date of termination.
g. Disclosure ofsimilar litigation (RPD No. 11)
In this litigation Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are "engaged in a nationwide campaign
to systematically and illegally steal Plaintiffs' customers" by, inter alia, unlawfully obtaining
personal information about Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers from OMV records to
solicit and divert those customers.23 Plaintiffs' claims for misappropriation of its trade secrets,
unfair competition, tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts
23

Second Amended Complaint, i1,r 2, 78-104.
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and business relationships, trespass, and civil conspiracy are predicated in part on the allegedly
unlawful use of such DMV records.
Defendants requested that Plaintiffs produce: "All documents (including but not limited
to any demand letters, complaints and settlement agreements) regarding any lawsuits filed or
threatened by Plaintiffs against any third party for improper or unlawful use or hosting of DMV
records or DMV information, including but not limited to any company that hosts DMV records
or DMV information on a database or website, and any competitor alleged to be using such
DMV records or DMV information." (RPD No. 11). Defendants assert this request is relevant to
Plaintiffs' trade secret claim and whether Plaintiffs derive value from and attempt to protect this
alleged trade secret information from competitors that engage in the same alleged conduct.
The Court finds this request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence regarding the trade secrets claim but finds the request for "all" such
documents related to other litigation overly broad and unduly burdensome. Plaintiffs are ordered
to, within fifteen (15) days of this order, supplemental their production with any demand letters
and complaints regarding any lawsuits filed or threatened by Plaintiffs against third party entities
(other than Defendants and their affiliates) for improper or unlawful use or hosting of DMV
records or DMV information.

E. Additional Discovery Disputes Raised by Plaintiffs
As noted above, in this litigation Plaintiffs allege Defendants offered referral fees to
Plaintiffs' employees to "bribe" them to divert current and prospective customers from Plaintiffs
to Defendants.

24

Plaintiffs' claims for unfair competition, tortious interference with the Direct

Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships, trespass, and civil conspiracy
are predicated in part on the allegedly unlawful solicitation of Plaintiffs' employees. In
24

Second Amended Complaint, iii! 3, 107-112.
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Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defendants, Plaintiffs asked Defendants to identify: all of
Defendants' employees who offered to pay or paid a referral fee to any employee or agent of
Plaintiffs in exchange for the referral of business; a description of the compensation offered or
paid; the amount of the compensation paid or value offered; the date the compensation was paid;
the contact information of the person who paid the compensation; and the identity and contact
information of the person to whom the compensation was paid.

25

With respect to this discovery request, the parties previously discussed engaging an
independent, third party to compare a list of Defendants' referral fee payments with a list of
Plaintiffs' employees. Specifically, Defendants' referral fee payment information would be
cross-referenced with the names of Plaintiffs' employees and the search "hit" would be a
potential responsive match if the name and residence or place of employment of the employee
matched the same geographic area as Defendants' store from which the referral fee check was
issued. However, the parties ultimately could not agree on (I) the appropriate geographic filters
to use in relation to Plaintiffs' employees for the comparison process, (2) the relevant time period
for the search, and (3) the Defendant entities at issue.
Defendants argue the request is too broad and unduly burdensome and that Plaintiffs in
the Second Amended Compliant merely allege that Defendants "offered" to pay Plaintiffs'
employees a referral fee but do not allege (and have no proof) any such referral fees were
actually paid to Plaintiffs' employees. Thus, Defendants ask the Court to deny the discovery
request altogether. The Court disagrees. To the extent Defendants contend a propounding party is
required to prove its allegation before it may seek discovery to support it, such does not align
with Georgia law. See Bowden, 297 Ga. at 291 ("[I]n the discovery context, courts should and
ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that
25

Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defendants, Interrogatory No. 7.

17

is or may become an issue in litigation"); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adler, 254 Ga. App. 500,
505, 562 S.E.2d 809, 814 (2002) ("[T]he courts of this State have long recognized the overriding
policy of liberally construing the application of the discovery law. To hold otherwise would be to
give every litigant an effective veto of his adversaries' attempts at discovery'') (citing DeLoitte
Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376-377, 370 S.E.2d 194 (1988)).
Insofar as the alleged payment ofreferral fees to Plaintiffs' employees is squarely at issue
in this action and the Second Amended Complaint includes numerous, specific allegations that
such fees were repeatedly offered to Plaintiffs' employees (including during the pendency of this
action),

26

the Court finds the discovery request is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence. The request to compel a response to Interrogatory No. 7 is
hereby GRANTED IN PART but the request is narrowed to information in Defendants'
possession, custody, or control regarding referral fees actually paid to Plaintiffs' employees.27
Further, the Court finds the use of an independent third party to cross-reference the relevant
information, with expenses of the third party reviewer split equally, is an appropriate and
reasonable mechanism to narrow the request and reduce the burdens associated therewith.
Thus, to the extent the parties can agree to proceed with a third-party reviewer, the Court
directs as follows: With request to the geographic filter to use in the comparison process, the
state of the Plaintiffs' employee's residence or place of employee should be used as first
suggested in Defendants' Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' First
Interrogatories to Defendants.28 The relevant time period for the search should be Nov. 7, 2010,
26

See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, iMl I 08-11 I, Ex. I.
The Court previously granted "Plaintiffs' request to compel complete responses" to First Interrogatory No.
7 and ordered Defendants "to answer and produce any responsive documents in their possession, custody, or
control." See Order on Pending Motions and Requests (Mar. I 3, 20 I 8), pp. 27-29. The Court narrows that ruling as
set forth herein.
28
Defendants' Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defendants,
Interrogatory No. 7, Supplemental Response.
27
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which encompasses the applicable statute oflimitations for Plaintiffs' tortious interference claim.
Finally, the search should be limited to referral fees paid by the named Defendants.

II.

PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless:
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the

claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable
facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that
the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the
framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the
relief sought.. .. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be
construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts
regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor.
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake,
267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308, 309, 800 S.E.2d
366,368 (2017).
B. Analysis and Conclusions of Law
In Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and
Defendants' Amended Counterclaims29, Defendants allege Plaintiffs "with the sanction and
approval of management, have entered storefronts belonging to Counterclaim Plaintiffs under
false pretenses with the express purpose of obtaining [Defendants'] trade secrets and confidential
and proprietary financial information.t''" Specifically, Defendants allege Plaintiffs' employees
(allegedly known as "Operations Specialists"): would go to Defendants' stores to fill out pawn
applications; ask to use the restroom located in a non-public area; on the way to and from the
restroom they would allegedly trespass on non-public areas to photograph Defendants'
29
30

Hereinafter "Defs' Amended Counterclaims".
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC iJ45.
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confidential and proprietary information located on '"goal boards', which are summarizes of
sales targets (based on past performance) and financial progress"; and then they would email the
photographs to their supervisors.31

In particular, Defendants allege Zachary Farmer (allegedly one of Plaintiffs' Operation
Specialists) visited approximately 75 of Defendants' stores in multiple states including South
Carolina and Alabama for the purpose of photographing Defendants' goal boards, and he
photographed approximately 30 such goal boards. Another individual believed to be Holly
Calloway allegedly texted her supervisor photographs of Defendants' goal boards taken inside of
one of Defendants' stores in Ohio.32 Based on the foregoing allegations, Defendants' Second
Counterclaim asserts claims for: trespass; misappropriation and theft of trade secrets; Georgia
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"); conversion (in the alternative);
civil conspiracy; and litigation expenses. 33
a. Choice of law analysis with respect to Defendants' misappropriation of
trade secrets claim
Insofar as the law of the state where the tortious conduct occurred governs Defendants'
claim, Plaintiffs move to dismiss the trade secrets claim brought under the Georgia Trade Secrets
Act (Georgia "TSA") for any "goal boards" conduct that allegedly occurred in Ohio, Texas,
Alabama, or South Carolina. Defendants, in turn, urge that Georgia law should apply because the
31

Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ,Ml 46-52.
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ,1,149-50.
33
Defendants' Second Counterclaim is brought by Defendants: TitleMax of Alabama, Inc.; TitleMax of
Arizona, Inc.; TitleMax of Ohio, Inc.; TitleMax of Utah, Inc.; TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.; TitleMax of Missouri, Inc.;
TitleMax of Texas, Inc.; TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc.; and TitleMax of Virginia, Inc. The Second Counterclaim
is asserted against Plaintiffs: Anderson Financial Services, LLC; Andr, Inc.; Atlanta Title Loans, Inc.; Aycox, Inc.;
Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc.; Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc.; Aycox Enterprises, Ltd.; Cash Loans of Marietta,
Inc.; Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc.; Drummond Financial Services, LLC; Fairfax Financial Services, LLC;
Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc.; Kipling Financial Services, LLC; LoanMax, LLC;
LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; LoanSmart, LLC; Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc.; Meadowwood Financial Services,
LLC; Mid-American Title Loans, LLC; North American Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company;
North American Title Loans, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a
South Carolina limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
Select Management Funding, LLC; and Wellshire Financial Services, LLC.
32
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financial injury from the misappropriation occurred in Georgia and because applying foreign law
to Defendants' claims would invite inconsistent results and inefficiency.
As this Court previously noted when considering a conflict of laws analysis with respect
to Plaintiffs' misappropriation of trade secrets claim:
Under Georgia law, the lex loci delicti determines the substantive

rights of the parties. Ohio Southern Express Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga.
App. 867, 868(1), 140 S.E.2d 235. How do we determine the lex
loci delicti where the tort is transitory in nature? The general rule is
that "the place of wrong, the locus delicti, is the place where the
injury sustained was suffered rather than the place where the act
was committed, or, as it is sometimes more generally put, it is the
place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place." 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, § 12(2)(b),
459. Georgia follows the general rule: In Wardell v. Richmond
Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga. App. 378, 210 S.E.2d 854, we
observed that " 'The law of the place where the tort or wrong has
been committed is the law by which the liability is to be
determined, and the place of the wrong is the place where ... there
takes place the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort.' " Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., supra, at p.
380, 210 S.E.2d 854, quoting Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, 253
F.Supp. 119, 121 (N.D.Ga.1966).
Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903-04, 324 S.E.2d
738, 740 (1984). See Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 292 Ga. 748, 750, 740 S.E.2d 622, 625
(2013).
The Court, again, finds that the lex loci delicti is the place where the tortious act of
misappropriation and use of the trade secret occurred. See, e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430
F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (11th Cir. 2005) (where Ohio company brought trade secrets claim under
Ohio and Georgia law against former employee who previously worked for the company in
Florida but took a job in Georgia with a competitor and where Ohio company alleged it had
entrusted former employee with trade secret information that would inevitability be used during
employment with Georgia competitor, Georgia law governed); Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux
21

Labs., 1nc., 735 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd as modified, 908 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1990)
(Georgia law, rather than Iowa law, applied to poultry vaccine manufacturer's claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information because, although the vaccine
allegedly misappropriated by competitor was developed in Iowa, misappropriation and use of
trade secrets occurred at competitor's Georgia laboratory). 34

Insofar as the TSA of the state where the alleged misappropriation occurred governs,
Defendants cannot assert a GTSA claim for the alleged "goal boards" conduct that occurred in
Ohio, Texas, South Carolina, or Alabama. Nevertheless, given the allegations asserted in
Defendants' Amended Counterclaim and under Georgia's liberal notice pleading, Defendants
have asserted and may pursue misappropriation of trade secrets claims under the respective state
TSAs where the alleged misappropriation occurred.
b. Preemption of Counts I, III, W, Vand VI of the Second Counterclaim
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants claims of trespass, violation of the Georgia RICO
Act, conversion, civil conspiracy, and attorney's fees that are based on any alleged
misappropriation of confidential or proprietary information that occurred in Ohio or Alabama are
superseded and preempted by Ohio's and Alabama's TSA, respectively.
The Ohio TSA "displace[ s] conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of th[ e] state
providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret" but does not affect "[o ]ther civil
remedies that are not based on misappropriation of a trade secret." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§1333.67. "The preemption section of the [Ohio] TSA has been interpreted to bar claims which

34

See also TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., LLC, 300 Ga. 835, 838-39 n.7, 797 S.E.2d
842, 846 (2017) (in reviewing an interlocutory injunction previously issued in this matter and in considering whether
Plaintiffs showed there was a substantial likelihood that they would prevail on the merits of their claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets, holding that Plaintiffs' allegations "do not constitute a misappropriation of trade
secrets in Georgia" but noting Plaintiffs "may have a better chance of success on the merits of [their] claim of
misappropriation of trade secrets under the laws of other states" other than Georgia) (emphasis added).
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are based entirely on factual allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets." Glasstech, Inc. v.
TGL Tempering Sys., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1999). "In other words, a claim
is preempted if it is 'no more than a restatement of the same operative facts which would plainly
and exclusively spell out only trade secret appropriation."' Jedson Eng'g, Inc. v. Spirit Constr.
Servs., Inc., No. 1 :08CV413, 2010 WL 11538008, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2010) (citing
Glasstech, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 730. See Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prod., Inc.,

933 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ("Where the common-law claim possesses an
independent factual basis separate from the factual allegations establishing a UTSA claim, then
the portion of the claim supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption") (citing
Int'I Paper Co. v. Goldschmidt, 872 F.Supp.2d 624,635 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
Similarly, the Alabama TSA "replace[s] common law tort remedies for the
misappropriation of trade secrets." Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 37 (Ala. 1991).
Thus, a claimant "may not pursue both statutory and common law theories of recovery for
the ... alleged misappropriation of 'trade secrets' or confidential documents." Bell Aerospace
Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (holding
plaintiff "may not pursue its breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under a theory that is essentially the
same as its ATSA claim").
i.

Trespass

"Every act which unlawfully interferes with a private property owner's absolute right to
enjoy its property is a tort for which an action shall lie. A person commits trespass when he
knowingly and without authority enters upon the land of another after having received prior
notice that such entry is forbidden." Pope v. Pulte Horne Corp., 246 Ga. App. 120, 120, 539
S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (2000) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Rababy v. Metter, 2015-

23

Ohio-1449,
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30 N.E.3d 1018, 1025 ("[T]he elements of a successful trespass claim are an

unauthorized intentional act, and entry upon law in the possession of another"); Drummond Co.
v. Walter Indus., Inc., 962 So. 2d 753, 782 (Ala. 2006) ("[T]he gist of any trespass action is
the interference with a right to possession of property").
Here, Defendants allege Plaintiffs "have intentionally intruded upon [their] property for
the purpose of obtaining [their] confidential financial information" and assert such "intrusions
were without [Defendants'] consent.v" Insofar as "the operative facts of the trespass claim relate
to the interference with [Defendants'] property rights" (see Jedson Eng'g, Inc. v., No.
1 :08CV413, 2010 WL 11538008, at *6) and are based on an entirely different "theor[y] of
recovery" than a misappropriation of trade secrets claim (compare Bell Aerospace Servs., Inc.,
690 F. Supp. 2d at 1277; Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 37 (Ala. 1991)), the Court
finds the common law trespass claim is not preempted by the Ohio TSA or the Alabama TSA.
Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the trespass claim.
ii. RICO Claim
Under Georgia's RICO statute, it is "unlawful for any person, through a pattern of
racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature,
including money." O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a). Similarly, it is unlawful for "any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." O.C.G.A. 16-14-4-(b). A "racketeering
activity," also known as a "predicate act," is the commission of, the attempt to commit, or the
solicitation or coercing of another to commit a "crime which is chargeable by indictment" under
certain laws of the state of Georgia and the United States. O.C.G.A. §16-14-3(5).
35

Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC 1il 54-55.
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Defendants allege Plaintiffs violated the Georgia RICO Act "by engaging in a pattern of
racketeering activity, the purpose and result of which was to steal [Defendants'] trade secrets"
and assert that "[t]hrough this pattern of racketeering, [Plaintiffs] have acquired an interest in or
control of personal property, including Defendants' trade secrets."

36

Insofar as the Ohio TSA

expressly does not affect "criminal remedies ... whether or not based on misappropriation of a
trade secret" (see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.67(8)(3)) and whereas the Alabama TSA only
preempts "common law theories of recovery" for the misappropriation of trade secrets (see
Allied Supply Co., 585 So. 2d at 37), the Courts finds the Georgia RICO claim is not
preempted.37 Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the RICO claim.
iii.

Conversion

"[C]onversion consists of an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over personal property belonging to another, in hostility to his rights; an act of
dominion over the personal property of another inconsistent with his rights; or an unauthorized
appropriation." Nash v. United Bank-Thomaston, 319 Ga. App. 179, 181, 734 S.E.2d 238,241
(2012). See also Dice v. White Family Cos., 2007-0hio-5755, ,r 17, 173 Ohio App. 3d 472,477,
878 N.E.2d 1105, 1108-09 ("Conversion is an exercise of dominion or control wrongfully
exerted over property in denial of or under a claim inconsistent with the rights of another"); Ex
parte Anderson, 867 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (Ala. 2003) ("To prove conversion, [a plaintiff] must
present evidence of a wrongful taking or a wrongful detention or interference, or an illegal
assumption of ownership, or an illegal use or misuse") ( citations and punctuation omitted).

36

nd

Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2 CC iM! 66-67.
Indeed, although not squarely addressed in the parties' papers, it is questionable whether any Georgia court
has held or would hold that another state's trade secret laws preempt a claim otherwise authorized under Georgia
statute.
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Here, Defendants assert a claim of conversion "in the altemative".38 They allege
Plaintiffs, through the actions of their employees, "have wrongly asserted dominion over
[Defendants'] property, namely their confidential financial information, inconsistent with
[Defendants'] right of ownership."39 Specifically, they allege Plaintiffs "unlawfully and
knowingly came into actual possession of Counterclaim Plaintiffs' confidential financial
information" and used it "for their own benefit.?" The Court finds Defendants' alternative,
common law conversion claim, which is predicated on the unlawful taking and use of their
confidential financial information rests on the exact same facts and theory of recovery as their
misappropriation of trade secrets claim and, thus, it is preempted under the Ohio TSA and
Alabama TSA. Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect to the conversion
claim.

iv. Civil Conspiracy
"A claim of civil conspiracy requires a pleading of facts showing that two or more
persons, acting in concert, engaged in conduct that constitutes a tort. Absent the underlying tort,
there can be no liability for civil conspiracy." Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334
Ga. App. 826, 835, 780 S.E.2d 689, 697 (2015) ( citation and punctuation omitted). See also
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 1998-Ohio-294, 83 Ohio St. 3d 464, 475, 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 ("The
tort of civil conspiracy is a malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another in
person or property, in a way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages ... An
underlying unlawful act is required before a civil conspiracy claim can succeed") (citations and
punctuation omitted); Hooper v. Columbus Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 956 So. 2d 1135, 1141

38

Defs' Amended Counterclaims at p. 57 (title to Second Counterclaim, "Count IV Conversion (In the
Alternative").
39
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ,i 76.
40
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2"d CC i1,i 78- 79.
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(Ala. 2006) ("Civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an
unlawful end or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means ... The gist of an action alleging
civil conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself but, rather, the wrong committed") (citations and
punctuation omitted).
Here, Defendants allege Plaintiffs "have conspired with each other to engage in trespass,
misappropriation or theft of trade secrets, actions prohibited by Georgia's RICO law, and
conversion." 41

Given the Court's rulings above, there remain claims for trespass,

misappropriation or theft of trade secrets, and violation of Georgia's RICO Act that are not
preempted and for which Defendant have at least stated a claim for civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs'
Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the civil conspiracy claim.
v. Litigation Expenses
Defendants seek an award of their litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, alleging
Plaintiffs "have acted in bad faith, been stubbornly litigious, and have cause[d] [Defendants]
unnecessary trouble and expenses.':" Importantly, "O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 does not create an
independent cause of action" but rather "merely establishes the circumstances in which a
plaintiff may recover the expenses of litigation as an additional element of his damages."
Gardner v. Kinney, 230 Ga. App. 771, 772, 498 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1998). Here, insofar as claims
remain that are not preempted, Defendants have at least stated a claim for relief under O.C.G.A.
§ 13-6-11. Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to this claim.

41
42

Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC ii 83.
Defs' Amended Counterclaims, 2nd CC 1il 88-89.
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III.

Motions regarding noticed depositions

Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a protective order quashing the proposed
depositions of Rod Aycox (Chief Executive Officer and managing member of certain Plaintiffs
and an affiliated company called Select Management Resources, Inc.) and Jesse Anderson
(Plaintiffs' Vice President of Operations in Texas).43 Similarly, Defendants request that the Court
enter an order quashing the proposed deposition of Tracy Young (the primary stakeholder in
TMX Finance, LLC and the Chief Executive Officer of TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. and its
affiliates)." Opposing parties are directed to submit any response to the foregoing requests
within ten (10) days of this order after which the Court will take these matters under
advisement.
IV.

Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
Pending before the Court are two partial motions for summary judgment: Defendant-

Counterclaim Plaintiff TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and
Plaintiffs North American Title Loans, LLC and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. 's Motion for
Summary Judgment on Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.'s Twenty-Third Defense and
Counterclaim for Unfair Competition. A hearing on the foregoing motions shall be held on Feb.
28, 2018 at 10:00 AM. The hearing will take place in Courtroom 8H of the Fulton County
Courthouse, 136 Pryor Street, SW, 9th Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. A court reporter will not be
provided. If the parties wish for the hearing or any other court proceeding to be taken down,
counsel must confer and make appropriate arrangements to have a court reporter present.

43

44

Plaintiffs' Letter dated Jan. 4, 2019.
Defendants' Letter dated Jan. 10, 2019.
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SO ORDERED this

2/ V.day ofJanuary, 2019.
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